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Class Action and Aggregate Litigation: A 
Comparative International Analysis 
D. Brooks Smith* 
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This Article examines the American class action through a 
comparative lens, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages relative 
to three collective action devices from England and Wales: the 
representative action, the Group Litigation Order, and the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal action. Five insights emerge. First, the Article tracks the 
rise of “professional objectors” in the U.S. and proposes ways England can 
curb similar abuses. Second, the Article excavates the potential for 
collusion between American class representatives, counsel, and 
defendants, and identifies ways England can avoid the same perverse 
incentives. Third, the Article details problematic examples of cy pres 
 
  *This Article was originally delivered as a lecture at a Continuing Legal Education 
program led by Waynesburg University’s Stover Center for Constitutional Studies and 
Moral Leadership in Cambridge, England on July 29, 2019. It is reproduced here with 
minimal alteration. In agreeing to its publication, Judge Smith expresses his deep gratitude 
to Gillian Schroff, Esquire, for her extensive research into aggregate litigation devices 
currently available in Britain and Wales, and for her diligence and enduring patience in 
working with him on numerous drafts that preceded presentation of the lecture and its 
publication.  Any errors that appear—be they plain, clear, or even reversible—are the sole 
responsibility of Judge Smith. 
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settlements in America as a cautionary tale for England, which recently 
expanded reliance on cy pres relief in consumer regulatory suits. Fourth, 
the Article grapples with the uniquely American issue of “strike suits”—
meritless putative class actions filed for their settlement value—and 
applauds steps England has taken to avoid similar misuse. Fifth, the Article 
discusses the evolving U.S. jurisprudence on class action waivers with an 
eye to reform in both systems. In the end, the Article hopes to help jurists 
and litigants on both sides of the Atlantic attain a more efficient and 
effective system of aggregate litigation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Good morning. It is great to be back with all of you. Last year at this 
gathering, I decided to take on the topic of legislative redistricting, or to 
employ the pejorative, “gerrymandering.”  I expected that by the time we 
had convened here in Cambridge in 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court would 
have provided guidance on the subject. Instead, the Court decided to wait 
me out. Well, as the old adage goes, “fool me once . . . .” So I decided 
some months ago that this year I would talk about a jurisprudential subject 
that has long intrigued me: the U.S. class action device and complex 
litigation. Specifically, I intend to discuss a few of the problems that have 
arisen in U.S. class actions and draw some connections between the U.S. 
class action and collective actions here in England and Wales. 
 In 1974, Supreme Court Justice William Douglas encapsulated the 
value of a class action, explaining:   
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I think in our society that is growing in complexity there are bound to 
be innumerable people in common disasters, calamities, or ventures 
who would go begging for justice without the class action but who 
could with all regard to due process be protected by it. Some of these 
are consumers whose claims may seem de minimis but who alone have 
no practical recourse for either remuneration or injunctive relief. Some 
may be environmentalists who have no photographic development 
plant about to be ruined because of air pollution by radiation but who 
suffer perceptibly by smoke, noxious gases, or radiation. Or the 
unnamed individual may be only a ratepayer being excessively 
charged by a utility or a homeowner whose assessment is slowly rising 
beyond his ability to pay. The class action is one of the few legal 
remedies the small claimant has against those who command the status 
quo.1 
More recently, it has been explained that the “central rationale for the 
class action aggregation” is that it “enables plaintiffs to exploit the 
‘economies of scale’ the defendant already naturally enjoys from treating 
separate claims as a single litigation unit” and thereby prevents “the 
defendant from using the plaintiffs’ numerosity against them.”2 As 
explained by Judge Posner:   
The class action is an ingenious procedural innovation that enables 
persons who have suffered a wrongful injury, but are too numerous for 
joinder of their claims alleging the same wrong committed by the same 
defendant or defendants to be feasible, to obtain relief as a group, a 
class as it is called. The device is especially important when each claim 
is too small to justify the expense of a separate suit, so that without a 
class action there would be no relief, however meritorious the claims.3 
 That being said, there can be no doubt that the U.S. class action 
device also presents risks that can, and have at times, damaged the 
integrity of the judicial process. As noted by Congress in the 2005 Class 
Action Fairness Act, “[c]lass action lawsuits are an important and valuable 
part of the legal system when they permit the fair and efficient resolution 
of legitimate claims of numerous parties,” but “there have been abuses of 
the class action device that have – (A) harmed class members with 
legitimate claims and defendants that have acted responsibly; (B) 
adversely affected interstate commerce; and (C) undermined public 
respect for our judicial system.”4   
 
1. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185–86 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting 
in part). 
2. Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in 
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1380–81, 1383 (2000). 
3. Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014). 
4. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as 
amended in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, and 1711–15 (2005)). 
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Although I’m not aware of a data bank that currently maintains 
statistics as to the number of putative class actions filed in the United 
States each year,5 filings certainly number in the thousands.6 Indeed, in the 
one category of putative class action filings that is closely monitored—
federal securities class actions—403 putative class actions were filed in 
federal court in 2018 alone.7 The same study reports that, since 1996, 
settlements in securities class actions alone have reached a total of over 
$99 billion.8 One would hope that the vast majority of these are 
meritorious claims and good faith settlements, but we know that at least 
some are not.   
And our class action device has often been viewed with skepticism 
on this side of the Atlantic.9 Based on the potential for abuse and the vast 
sums involved in U.S. class actions, outsiders looking in (including our 
friends here in England) also have reason to view the U.S.-style class 
action with concern.10 To be sure, a liberal class action device offers many 
potential advantages. And the trend seems to be that European countries 
are borrowing certain features of the U.S. model.11 As explained by two 
distinguished experts in the class action field:  “Once decried as the 
perversity of rapacious Americans, class actions are now the focus of 
 
5. Deborah R. Hensler, From Sea to Shining Sea: How and Why Class Actions Are 
Spreading Globally, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 965, 985 (2017) (noting that “no jurisdiction 
publishes official statistics on the number of complaints filed in which plaintiff seek to 
proceed collectively” and “[n]o one knows how many class actions are filed annually in 
federal or state courts in the United States”). 
6. Id. at 986–87 (citing Deborah R. Hensler, Can Private Class Actions Enforce 
Marketplace Regulations? Do They? Should They?, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY PROCESS (Francesca Bignami & 
David Zaring eds., 2016)) (noting author’s previous estimate that approximately 6,500 
class action complaints were filed in 2007). 
7. Stanford Law Sch., Filings by Year: Federal Securities Class Action Litigation 
1996 – YTD, SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, https://stanford.io/2lKqGtc (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Clearinghouse Filings 1996–YTD]. 
8. Stanford Law Sch., Key Stats: Box scores or key statistics from 1996 to YTD, SEC. 
CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, https://stanford.io/2lUzBZ5 (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
9. Neil H. Andrews, Fundamentals of Multi-Party or Collective Litigation 16 (Univ. 
of Cambridge Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 21/2014, 2014), https://bit.ly/2mlLZSl 
(noting the “xenophobic fear of the USA system” in the UK, and explaining that “[t]he fear 
is strong in the United Kingdom but rises to terror in some Member States of the European 
Union”). 
10. As Lord Denning has stated, “[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant 
drawn to the United States.” See Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch [1983] 1 WLR 
730 at 733 (Eng.); see also Shinthean Ng, Class Action (Not US-Style): Enhancing Access 
to Justice, 6 MANCHESTER REV. L. CRIME & ETHICS 49, 53 (2017) (“Despite the argument 
that class action provides greater access to the courts, it is frequently criticized for creating 
an unsavoury litigation culture, as is the case in the US jurisdiction.”). 
11. See Hensler, supra note 5, at 966, 967 tbl.1 (noting that as of 2017, thirty-seven 
jurisdictions in addition to the U.S. adopted some sort of class action procedure, including 
fifteen countries in Europe). 
2020 CLASS ACTION . . . A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 307 
significant reform efforts in many European countries.”12 In developing 
their own class action system, England and Wales have moved hesitantly 
toward adopting some elements of the U.S. system, while imposing 
additional safeguards and restrictions aimed at preventing some of the 
abuses in the U.S. system. 
In the time allotted me, I will briefly describe the U.S. class action 
system and its counterpart in England and Wales. I will then explore some 
of the hurdles we have faced in the U.S. and, based on our experience, try 
to provide some insight into how England and Wales might avoid some of 
the problems we have experienced. As one academic has put it, “[t]here is 
no reason to believe that the whole ‘Yankee package’”—warts and all—
need “invade a foreign system through the window opened by the class 
action device.”13 
II. U.S. CLASS ACTION SYSTEM 
As some of you may know, class actions are governed by Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Rule has antecedents that reach all the 
way back to 1842 and Equity Rule 48.14 And most scholars agree that the 
roots of the class action lie with the “bill of peace,” an equitable device 
that developed here on British soil. But it is Rule 23, as amended in 1966, 
that embodies the modern class action as we know it.  
The first major step for a plaintiff in pursuing any class action is to 
satisfy the prerequisites under Rule 23(a). Those are (1) Numerosity – that 
the class is sufficiently large to justify class treatment, rather than 
proceeding by another procedural device, such as joinder; (2) 
Commonality – that there are material questions of law or fact common to 
the class; (3) Typicality – that the claims of the representative parties align 
with the claims of the absent class members; and (4) Adequacy – that the 
representative parties are capable of “fairly and adequately” representing 
and protecting the interests of the class.15 The judge to whom the class 
action has been assigned must determine that all four requirements have 
been proven. 
Rule 23(b) provides for three types of class actions, so the second 
major determination to be made in any class action is deciding the 
appropriate class type for the claims at issue. The named plaintiff or 
plaintiffs will ordinarily plead in a complaint—as well as in a motion to 
certify a class—which of these types should be certified. 
 
12. Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to 
Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 177, 179 (2009). 
13. Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil – A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 311, 322 (2003). 
14. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE 
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987). 
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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First, Rule 23(b)(1) provides for use of the class action device where 
class treatment is necessary to prevent inconsistent judgments against the 
defendant, or to ensure that absent class members’ rights are protected, 
such as in a limited fund case where all claims cannot be satisfied in whole. 
For example, some of you may recall the massive silicone-gel breast 
implant litigation of the 1990s. 21,000 cases were consolidated into a 
multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) in the Northern District of Alabama.16 
Claims against one defendant manufacturer, Inamed, were certified under 
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) as a settlement-only class.17 Approximately 15,000 
claims had been filed against Inamed,18 and the historic settlement value 
of the claims against the company was on average $18,500 per claim.19 
This amounted to a total liability of nearly $280 million. But Inamed had 
a negative valuation of $1.7 million.20 The District Judge explained, “the 
costs and risks of individual breast implant claims greatly exceed Inamed’s 
limited resources, which would soon be exhausted if individual litigation 
were allowed to continue, and . . . Inamed therefore constitutes a ‘limited 
fund’ against which claims are properly subject to class certification under 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B).”21 
Second, Rule 23(b)(2) provides for class-wide injunctive or 
declaratory relief. This class type was created mostly out of a desire to 
provide redress in civil rights cases. Indeed, the 1966 drafting committee 
expressly identified civil rights cases as “illustrative” of the type of action 
where the 23(b)(2) class mechanism will apply.22 By nature, class actions 
under both Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) are mandatory. That means that all 
class members must remain part of the class, since a class-wide judgment 
is the only way to successfully bind them all. Anything less would result 
in the types of inconsistent verdicts those class types are designed to avoid.  
Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) establishes what is generally considered the 
quintessential U.S. class action, and its adoption was a major innovation. 
A product of the 1966 amendments, it allows for a damages class action 
on an opt-out basis, and is now the most popular form of class action in 
the U.S.23 And it’s the class-type primarily relevant to our discussions 
today. Because the claims underlying Rule 23(b)(3) class actions could 
 
16. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:97-CV-11441-RDP, 
2010 WL 11506713, at *2 (N.D. Ala. May 19, 2010). For more on the MDL device, see 
infra text accompanying notes 37–44. 
17. Id. at *10. 
18. Id. at *2. 
19. Id. at *3. 
20. Id.  
21. Id. at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the certification order, ECF 
No. 59 at ¶ 4). 
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
23. See Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY 
L.J. 1569, 1619 n.304 (2016). 
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instead be pursued on an individual basis, additional requirements must be 
satisfied before a class will be certified under that provision; the due 
process rights of individual class members must be protected. Specifically, 
a class representative must also establish that the questions of law or fact 
common to the class predominate over any individual issues, and that the 
class action device is superior to other methods of adjudicating the case.24 
Additional notice requirements also apply to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions 
to ensure that class members can exercise their opt-out rights on an 
informed basis.25  
Although not express within Rule 23, some courts have imposed a 
so-called “ascertainability” requirement as part of the certification analysis 
for a (b)(3) class action, meaning that the class must be clearly defined so 
that members of the class can be identified.26 For example, the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, on which I sit, requires that the class be 
“defined with reference to objective criteria” and that there be “a reliable 
and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative 
class members fall within the class definition.”27 Other courts have implied 
a more lenient standard, requiring only that the class be defined based on 
clear, objective criteria, without any feasibility requirement.28  As an aside, 
given the circuit-split on the standard for ascertainability, review by the 
U.S. Supreme Court may be imminent. Or not. As you know, my 
prognostication skills are less than stellar. But regardless of whether a 
stricter or more lenient standard is appropriate, some level of 
ascertainability must exist.29 Quite simply, the class action device will not 
be appropriate if significant individual fact-finding will be necessary to 
determine whether someone is even a member of the class.30 Given the 
opt-out nature of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, the ascertainability 
requirement is also necessary to ensure that class members can be given 
 
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
26. E.g., City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 439 
(3d Cir. 2017); Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015). 
27. See City Select Auto Sales Inc., 867 F.3d at 439. 
28. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657–58. 
29. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.222 (2004) (“Although the 
identity of individual class members need not be ascertained before class certification, the 
membership of the class must be ascertainable. Because individual class members must 
receive the best notice practicable and have an opportunity to opt out, and because 
individual damage claims are likely, Rule 23(b)(3) actions require a class definition that 
will permit identification of individual class members . . . .”). 
30. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012) (“If class 
members are impossible to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or 
‘mini-trials,’ then a class action is inappropriate.”). 
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adequate notice of their opt-out rights.31 All of this makes the certification 
process for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions very rigorous. 
Apart from the standard Rule 23(b) certification process, Rule 23(e) 
also allows for class certification for the sole purpose of settlement. These 
so-called settlement-only classes have become increasingly popular in the 
last few decades. Under Rule 23(e), the parties must provide notice of the 
proposed settlement to the class.32 In traditional A v. B litigation, a 
presiding judge has no formal role in settlement. But in a class action, 
because the court acts as something of a fiduciary for absent class 
members,33 the judge must conduct a hearing to determine whether the 
settlement proposal is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”34 Class members, 
having received notice of a proposed settlement, also have the opportunity 
to file objections to the settlement.35 If the court approves settlement of a 
class action—or if the case otherwise results in a judgment on the merits—
such a judgment will be binding on all class members in Rule 23(b)(1) and 
(b)(2) class actions. In a Rule 23(b)(3) action, the judgment will have res 
judicata effect for all class members who chose not to opt-out of the 
class.36 
We could spend all day discussing the many complexities of Rule 23. 
We have already covered the grist of what would be the first three sessions 
of the Class Action seminar I teach at Penn State Law. But for our purposes 
today, my summary of Rule 23(a) and (b) is enough. 
Before I turn to discussion of English collective actions, I want to 
touch on another collective action procedure in the United States, the 
multidistrict litigation, or MDL. MDLs, while perhaps not provoking the 
same level of discussion and debate as class actions, have quietly become 
a dominant force in federal civil litigation. Indeed, one source reports that, 
for the first time, a majority of all pending civil cases in federal court—
52%—were in MDLs in fiscal year 2018.37 This is a huge development. 
The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation reports that 156,511 
 
31. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]scertainability 
and a clear class definition allow potential class members to identify themselves for 
purposes of opting out of a class.”). 
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1).  
33. See, e.g., Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 594 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he 
District Court evaluates the agreement as a fiduciary for absent class members. The reason 
for judicial approval is to ensure that other unrepresented parties (absent class members) 
and the public interest are fairly treated by the settlement reached between the class 
representatives and the defendants.” (citations omitted)); 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:40 (5th ed. 2011 & Supp. 2019) (“[T]he court’s role as 
fiduciary is primarily to ensure that the class’s own agents – its class representatives and 
class counsel – have not sold out its interests in settling the case.”). 
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5). 
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3). 
37. Dave Simpson, MDLs Surge To Majority Of Entire Federal Civil Caseload, 
LAW360 (Mar. 14, 2019, 10:54 PM), https://bit.ly/2FdxQfK. 
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cases were pending in MDL actions as of September 30, 2018.38  By June 
19th of 2019, that number had fallen slightly to 141,721 pending actions.39 
By comparison, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
reported 339,313 total pending civil cases in federal courts in 2018.40 This 
represents a tectonic shift in the processing of federal civil cases, so any 
discussion of U.S. collective actions would be incomplete without a brief 
note as to how MDLs work. 
MDLs are a product of statute, rather than a procedural device 
available under the civil rules. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 created a seven-judge 
judicial panel on multidistrict litigation to administer the process. Under 
section 1407, when there are multiple civil actions on the same topic 
pending in different districts, the panel may consolidate and transfer the 
cases to a single district for coordinated pretrial proceedings before one 
judge. The MDL process may be initiated either by the judicial panel on 
multidistrict litigation acting sua sponte or by a party who believes that 
MDL treatment may be appropriate for their case.41 Like class actions, the 
MDL process is designed to “promote the just and efficient conduct” of 
complex actions,42 and all cases subject to an MDL order will be bound by 
the MDL judge’s rulings. But the MDL process is about coordination, so 
unlike class actions, MDL rulings do not bind non-parties. Each plaintiff 
must still file his or her own individual claim and the cases are simply 
consolidated for coordinated proceedings on the common pretrial issues. 
Also unlike class actions, the MDL process does not resolve the merits of 
the claims at issue. Instead, cases are consolidated only for pretrial 
proceedings. After resolving as many pretrial matters as possible, the 
transferee judge remands the cases to the districts in which they were 
originally filed. That’s where any further proceedings and final resolution 
take place.43 Notably, though, the class action device is often used 
alongside an MDL. It is not uncommon to see claims that have been 
consolidated in an MDL also certified as a class as part of the MDL 
proceedings, and often for settlement purposes.44 
 
38. J.P.M.L., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION UNDER 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407 – FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 3 (2018), https://bit.ly/2kPs4KR.  
39. J.P.M.L., MDL STATISTICS REPORT – DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS 
BY DISTRICT 5 (2019), https://bit.ly/2kkAFFc. 
40. Table C–U.S. District Courts – Civil Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. 
CTS., https://bit.ly/2lTV5FD. (last visited Dec. 22, 2019). 
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
43. See id. 
44. See Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict 
Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 
1695–96 (2017). 
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III. UK (ENGLAND AND WALES) CLASS ACTION SYSTEM 
Next, I’ll turn briefly to the collective action options that are available 
in England and Wales. Our systems are quite different, but there are some 
evident similarities. And, as I’ve noted, it seems that England has looked 
to, and moved toward, the U.S.-style class action—but with caution.45 
Understandably, England has sought to avoid what are considered some 
of the excesses of the U.S. class action system.46 At the same time, 
however, England has not experienced some of the benefits accompanying 
a liberal, opt-out class action regime.47 The Consumer Rights Act of 2015, 
and with it the creation of a collective action device, was potentially a step 
toward providing some of those benefits in the consumer/anti-competitive 
business context.48 But a true English class action? As American lawyers 
and judges know it, it has yet to arrive. 
A. “Traditional” Forms of Multi-Party Litigation 
It is important to recognize that traditional forms of multi-party 
litigation remain a useful tool in England. Under English civil rules, any 
number of claimants or litigants may be joined as parties.49 For example, 
in a 2005 case, 50,000 shareholders were joined together as full parties to 
the proceeding.50 While we’ve used this same aggregation tool in the 
 
45. See Rachael P. Mulheron, Some Difficulties with Group Litigation Orders – and 
Why a Class Action is Superior, 24 C.J.Q. 40, 58 (2005) (“The class action device, as 
practised elsewhere . . . , seems to have been viewed with some trepidation by several 
senior English judiciary and academics alike . . . .”); see also Hensler, supra note 5, at 968 
(“Because the modern class action was first adopted in the United States and because most 
jurisdictions that have adopted the class action in the last decade refer to the ‘American 
class action’ as a model, if not to emulate then to avoid, it is reasonable to view class actions 
outside the United States as ‘legal transplants.’”). 
46. Neil H. Andrews, Multi-Party Actions and Complex Litigation in England, 23 
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012) (“There are dangers in adopting an ‘opt out’ system: 
potentially aggressive attempts to bring collective litigation; the prospect of very large 
gains being made by law firms; the fear of commercial and public entities being exposed 
to expensive and protracted litigation; inevitable increases in the cost of potential 
defendants’ defensive measures; in particular, consumers and businesses paying more for 
insurance cover.”). 
47. Mulheron, supra note 45, at 68 (“[T]he opt-out approach favoured by the great 
majority of class action regimes provides innumerable advantages that would further the 
[English Civil Procedure Rules’] overriding objective.”); see also Vicki Waye, Advantages 
and Disadvantages of Class Action Litigation (And Its Alternatives), 24 NZBLQ 109, 109 
(2018) (“Without an effective collective redress mechanism small claims may be 
uneconomical to pursue, those that cause mass harm thereby escape responsibility and 
scarce legal decision making resources are inefficiently deployed. Individualised legal 
determinations of similar matters can also lead to inconsistent outcomes, and consequently 
undermine the coherence and integrity of the justice system.”); Ng, supra note 10, at 54 
(“In order to see an increase in collective actions by consumers, some type of class action 
has to exist.”). 
48. See Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, § 47 (UK). 
49. See CPR 19.1 (UK); see also Andrews, supra note 46, at 14. 
50. Weir v. Sec’y of State for Transp. [2005] EWHC (Ch) 2192 (Eng.). 
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United States,51 a class action or multidistrict litigation is generally the 
preferred method when the number of litigants becomes unwieldy. In 
England, perhaps because turning to a different collective action procedure 
was not always possible, joinder procedures are more evolved. It is 
common for a joined group of claimants or defendants, such as the 50,000 
shareholders I just noted, to form an action committee to coordinate 
litigation.52 In a 2013 case, 104 claimants (represented by two law firms) 
joined together under a cooperation agreement to obtain a 52 million euro 
award.53 Action committees and cooperation agreements are also common 
in formal collective actions in the United States, but are typically not seen 
in cases involving joinder alone.   
So-called “test” cases, or bellwether trials, have also been a useful 
tool in England to produce “class-wide” res judicata.54 Those are cases in 
which a single A v. B case is tried in order to test the viability of, and obtain 
judgment on, claims that are relevant to a group of litigants. Bellwether 
trials are common in the United States as well, but they are generally used 
in the context of formal collective actions. For example, there are currently 
bellwether trials scheduled in the opioid MDL pending in the Northern 
District of Ohio.55 
B. Representative Actions 
Representative actions are the original mechanism for formal group 
litigation in England. These actions were in use in England prior to the 
adoption of Rule 23 in the United States. The representative action 
procedure is codified in English Civil Procedure Rule 19.6. Under this 
Rule, where multiple claimants have the same interest, a claimant may act 
as a representative for others having the same interest.56 Any judgment or 
order obtained when using this procedure is binding on all represented 
individuals, and it can be enforced by non-parties with permission of the 
court.57 This procedure resembles a U.S. class action in that party 
claimants act on behalf of a class of non-party claimants, and the non-party 
claimants will be bound by the judgment. The procedure also includes a 
means by which non-party claimants may opt-out. Represented non-
parties are automatically bound by any judgment or order, whether or not 
 
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19–20. 
52. Andrews, supra note 46, at 13.  
53. See Michael Brown & Elizabeth Clay, The English Class Action?, FINANCIER 
WORLDWIDE (Oct. 2015), http://bit.ly/2keog5L. 
54. RACHAEL P. MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 102–03 (2004); Andrews, supra note 46, at 2–3. 
55. Sarah Angelino & Stephen Copenhaver, Why Bellwethers Matter in the Opioid 
MDL, LAW360 (June 10, 2019, 1:53 PM), http://bit.ly/2kynuAP. 
56. CPR 19.6 (Eng.). 
57. See id. 
314 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:2 
they consent to the proceedings.58 But they can opt-out if they believe the 
judgment or order should not be enforced against them by later petitioning 
the court.  
Compared to the U.S. model, representative actions present some 
hurdles that have limited their effectiveness in practice.59 First, the 
requirement that represented parties all share the “same interests” was 
construed very strictly in the 1910 King’s Bench ruling in Markt & Co. 
Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd.60 The holding of Markt still holds sway, 
to some extent, and thereby burdens the representative action procedure to 
this day.61 In that case, it was held that the “same interests” requirement is 
satisfied only where the represented parties “enjoy[] identical contractual 
relationships created under the same commercial exercise that gave rise to 
a proportionate liability for a single identified loss.”62 The Court 
specifically held that the “same interest” requirement is not satisfied where 
different defenses may exist.63 “Although the modern trend is to give the 
rule an increasingly liberal interpretation,”64 even relatively recent cases 
have emphasized the need for “identity of interest.” Those cases have 
rejected a representative action where different defenses applied to the 
claims of represented parties, concluding that claimants do not have the 
same interest where “the claim is not equally beneficial to all members of 
the class” because some claims are limited by the defendant’s ability to 
raise a defense.65 This narrow interpretation stems from two concerns: 
binding non-parties who do not have an opportunity to litigate on their 
own; and prejudicing defendants who could be prevented from raising a 
defense that would bar claims by some represented individuals.66 
Although the U.S. class action system has similarly faced issues of unique 
individual interests or individual defenses arising in what are otherwise 
common claims, the flexibility of Rule 23 has generally resolved these 
issues through creation of subclasses or class actions that are limited to 
 
58. See MULHERON, supra note 54, at 92–93; Andrews, supra note 46, at 14. 
59. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 14–15 (explaining that “representative 
proceedings remain distinctly marginal in England” and “[i]t is very rare for English 
representative proceedings to culminate in a damages award in favour of the represented 
class”). 
60. See Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd. [1910] 2 KB 1021 at 1039 
(Moulton LJ) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
61. 7 CHRISTOPHER HODGES & STEFAAN VOET, DELIVERING COLLECTIVE REDRESS: 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 50 (2018). 
62. Emerald Supplies Ltd. v. British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA (Civ) 1284 [48] 
(Eng.) (emphasis added); see also Markt & Co. Ltd. [1910] 2 KB at 1026. 
63. See Markt & Co. Ltd. [1910] 2 KB at 1030. 
64. See Emerald Supplies Ltd. [2010] EWCA (Civ) at 1284 [4]. 
65. Id. 
66. Id.; see also Markt & Co. Ltd. [1910] 2 KB at 1039. 
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only certain issues. The rigidity of English representative actions has stood 
in the way of such accommodative procedures.67 
An example of this limitation on the representative action played out 
recently in a case filed against Google. An advocacy group filed an action 
on behalf of 4.4 million UK iPhone users, based on an alleged privacy 
violation on the part of Google.68 The damages alleged were 1 to 3 billion 
pounds.69 On August 10, 2018, the High Court dismissed the action, 
concluding in part that “a representative action would not be legitimate 
because those claimants who have suffered ‘damage’ would have different 
interests from one another, dependent on the individual facts of their 
case.”70 The court went on to note that “the individual claims are not viable 
as stand-alone litigation, and [other forms of collective relief are] 
impracticable, so that this representative action is in practice the only way 
in which these claims can be pursued.”71 Based on a strict application of 
the same-interest rule, the 4.4 million iPhone users were left without an 
opportunity for collective redress, despite the fact that the alleged violation 
by Google was committed in exactly the same way as to each user. As 
stated by the attempted representative party: “There now seems no 
alternative but for the government to fill this gap by legislating to give 
groups of consumers the right to affordable collective redress.”72  
Second, a significant hurdle for many potential claimants is that the 
representative party in a representative action must alone bear all of the 
costs of litigation, including fee-shifting if the representative party loses.73 
Having to personally bear costs plainly discourages someone from taking 
on what could be burdensome litigation on behalf of non-parties who are 
otherwise represented. These non-parties essentially enjoy a free-ride on 
the representative’s time and financial investment.74 This is especially 
problematic in consumer cases where each individual claimant’s damages 
are small and therefore no claimant is sufficiently motivated to bring a 
claim in the face of the cost and risk of litigation.75 In U.S. litigation, we 
 
67. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) (“When appropriate, an action may be brought or 
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(c)(5) (“When appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses that are each treated 
as a class under this rule.”); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 184 (1974) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (“The purpose of Rule 23 is to provide flexibility in the 
management of class actions, with the trial court taking an active role in the conduct of the 
litigation.”). 
68. See Lloyd v. Google LLC [2018] EWHC (QB) 2599 [2], [4] (Eng.). 
69. Id. at [4]. 
70. Id. at [89].  
71. Id. at [103]. 
72. Alex Hern, UK High Court Blocks Mass Privacy Action Against Google, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2018, 9:47 AM), https://bit.ly/2yavCL8. 
73. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 16.  
74. See Brown & Clay, supra note 53. 
75. See, e.g., Emerald Supplies Ltd. v. British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA (Civ) 
1284 [5] (Eng.) (“Consumer claims for overcharging are given as an example of a case in 
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call these “negative-value” suits because the cost of investigating the harm 
and seeking legal redress is higher than any potential recovery.76 As my 
friends Professor Issacharoff and Dean Klonoff have written, “the most 
important element in ensuring justice is making sure that some agent – 
dare we say, any agent – will rise to the occasion to take up the case.”77 
Given the risks involved for a representative under the English system, this 
key step is unlikely to occur. 
C. Group Litigation Orders 
To remedy some of the restrictive characteristics of representative 
actions and create something that more closely resembles a U.S. class 
action, England introduced Group Litigation Orders (“GLO”) in 2000, 
codified at Civil Procedure Rule 19.10.78 Since that time, Group Litigation 
Orders have been the primary tool for bringing collective actions.79  
“The key features and normal effect of any GLO,” as the device is 
known, have been described as follows: 
 it identifies the common issues which are a pre-condition for 
participation in a GLO;  
 it provides for the establishment and maintenance of a register of 
GLO claims;  
 it gives the managing court wide powers of case management, 
including the selection of test claims and the appointment of a lead 
solicitor for the claimants or the defendants, as appropriate;  
 it provides for judgments on test claims to be binding on the other 
parties on the group register; and  
 it makes special provision for costs orders.80 
Unlike representative actions, the GLO system is an opt-in system in 
which each member of the group is a party to the proceedings and must 
prove individual loss.81 In that way, the GLO regime resembles MDL 
 
which each person’s damage is small, but a representative action may not be very useful: 
although many people are affected by legal wrongdoing, that may not be to a sufficient 
extent to motivate any one of them to commence an action against the wrongdoers.” 
(citation omitted)). 
76. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litigation: 
Law, Culture, and Incentives, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1895, 1900–01 (2017). 
77. Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1186 (2009). 
78. Ng, supra note 10, at 52.  
79. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 21.  
80. Autologic Holdings PLC v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue [2005] 3 CMLR 2 [86] 
(Eng.); see also Andrews, supra note 46, at 21–22.  
81. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 22.  
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practice in the U.S.82 The opt-in GLO system eliminates some of the 
concerns underlying the “same interest” representative action requirement 
because there is no risk of binding unknowing non-parties to the judgment. 
Also, defendants will be able to raise any applicable defenses against each 
claimant. Accordingly, claims governed by a GLO need only “give rise to 
common or related issues of fact or law.”83 The opt-in system also allows 
for costs to be shared across the group, which helps to relieve the cost–
benefit problem attendant to representative actions.84   
GLOs do have their drawbacks. Any opt-in system has its 
limitations.85 There can be no global peace following such a collective 
action because potential claimants who choose not to opt in are always 
free to pursue their individual claims.86 And because individuals can 
choose to pursue their own claims, the efficiency purposes of collective 
actions are limited. Thus a GLO does not eliminate the need for repetitious 
actions.87 Further, an opt-in procedure requires claimants to take 
affirmative steps to obtain relief—steps the claimant may be unable or 
unwilling to take for many of the same reasons that a claimant may decline 
to take individual action.88 So access to justice is limited by an opt-in class 
device. 
While the GLO option provides for more liberal group litigation than 
does a representative action, and is in fact the primary collective action 
tool in England and Wales, in practice it has not been employed nearly as 
often as the U.S. class action. Not even close. As of May 2018, there had 
been only 105 GLOs in the 18 years since the procedure was introduced.89 
Compare that with the rate of putative class action filings in the United 
 
82. See Hensler, supra note 5, at 979–80 (noting that GLOs in England “play[] a 
similar role” to MDLs). 
83. CPR 19.10 (Eng.). 
84. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 21.  
85. See Estelle Hurter, Opting in or opting out in class action proceedings: from 
principles to pragmatism?, 50 DE JURE 60, 74 (2017), https://bit.ly/2kMHS11 (“[O]pt-in 
regimes do not promote inclusivity, and an under-inclusive class does not ensure access to 
justice for all of the individuals who fall within the class definition.”). 
86. See Mulheron, supra note 45, at 54–55 (“[U]nder an opt-in regime, the defendant 
loses some degree of comfort in knowing how many of these individual proceedings it is 
possible to face.”). 
87. Id. at 54 (explaining that “[a] multiplicity of litigation is not necessarily avoided” 
in GLO proceedings); see also Ng, supra note 10, at 55 (noting that opt-out systems have 
a much higher participation rate than opt-in systems).  
88. See Mulheron, supra note 45, at 54 (“[T]here are various barriers, whether they 
be economic (e.g. too poor to afford any legal assistance), psychological (e.g. afraid of 
backlash from the defendant if one is seen to join a group action) or social (e.g. immigrants 
with a poor knowledge of English or of English legal systems), that discourage or prevent 
affirmative action being taken to opt in.”); see also Waye, supra note 47, at 116 (“There is 
little incentive for claimants with small claims to initiate an individual claim or to join the 
GLO register where the costs of taking such action outweigh the value of their claim.”).  
89. Guidance: Group Litigation Orders, GOV.UK, https://bit.ly/2kEy759 (last updated 
Dec. 26, 2019). 
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States, where in 2018 alone—and only in the field of federal securities 
litigation—403 class actions were filed.90 Between state and federal court, 
the total number of putative class actions filed in the U.S. since 2000 likely 
falls somewhere in the tens of thousands.91 The relatively low number of 
GLOs could be due in part to the extensive case management required in 
a GLO, including the need for initial ratification by the court.92 But to the 
extent the low number of GLOs indicates that consumers and other injured 
parties are not generally able to secure relief on a class-wide basis,93 it 
could be argued that the GLO procedure has serious deficiencies.94 
D. Competition Appeal Tribunal Collective Proceedings 
The newest form of collective action in England and Wales—and the 
form that most closely resembles a U.S.-style class action—is the 
collective proceeding before the Competition Appeal Tribunal, which I 
will refer to as a “CAT” collective action. The CAT collective action was 
introduced in Section 47 of the Consumer Rights Act of 2015.95 Although 
CAT collective actions may be either opt-in or opt-out at the discretion of 
the Competition Appeal Tribunal, the CAT procedure provides the first 
English opt-out class action device with class-wide relief and the 
opportunity for class-wide aggregate damages.96 Unlike the U.S. class 
action system, however, CAT collective actions can be used only for the 
limited purpose of challenging anti-competitive conduct under the 
Competition Act of 1998.97 And, as indicated by the name, such collective 
proceedings may be adjudicated only before the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal.98 
 
90. Clearinghouse Filings 1996–YTD, supra note 7. 
91. Cf. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their 
Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 816–30 (2010) (identifying 688 federal 
class action settlements in 2006 and 2007). See generally Jonah B. Gelbach & Deborah R. 
Hensler, What We Don’t Know About Class Actions But Hope to Know Soon, 87 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 65 (2018) (describing ongoing efforts to calculate the total number of class actions 
annually). 
92. See CPR 19.11 (Eng.); see also Andrews, supra note 46, at 16.  
93. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 24 (“The English GLO figures (an ‘opt in’ system) 
are perhaps disconcerting if one takes an absolutist approach to ‘access to justice.’”); see 
also Ng, supra note 10, at 52 (explaining that “[t]he opt-in requirement attached to GLOs 
means that they are unlikely to be used for cases involving mass consumer losses where 
individuals face significant barriers to ‘opting-in’”). 
94. See Mulheron, supra note 45, at 40 (“[T]he opt-in approach adopted by the GLO 
regime is less than satisfactory, is wasteful of litigants’ resources, and is beset with 
problems.”).   
95. Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, § 47 (UK). 
96. See Rachael P. Mulheron, The United Kingdom’s New Opt-Out Class Action, 37 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 814, 816 (2017). 
97. Competition Act 1998, c. 4, § 47A(2) (UK); see also Mulheron, supra note 96, at 
816. 
98. Competition Act 1998, c. 4, § 47A(1) (UK). 
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CAT collective actions may be brought by either a class member who 
acts as a class representative or by what is called an “ideological claimant” 
who is not a class member but is otherwise a suitable representative.99 This 
is in part based on the fact that CAT collective actions arise in the context 
of anti-competition laws. UK lawmakers wanted to include as potential 
representatives trade associations and consumer associations that already 
represent consumers and are well-positioned to assert claims arising under 
the Competition Act.100 The “ideological claimant” serves a purpose 
similar to a U.S. plaintiff with organizational standing in that the 
ideological claimant, while not having its own claim, has some direct 
interest in the class proceedings due to its association with the individuals 
who do have claims.101  
A CAT collective action begins with a “collective proceeding order” 
from the Competition Appeal Tribunal.102 Much like class certification in 
the U.S., the Tribunal looks to various factors to determine whether the 
action is appropriate for collective treatment. Specifically, the Tribunal 
considers whether there is commonality between the class claims, whether 
a collective proceeding is superior to other procedures, and whether there 
is minimum numerosity.103 The Tribunal also looks to the preliminary 
merits of the claim, the costs and benefits of bringing the claim as a 
collective action, whether there is an adequate class definition, the need 
for collective treatment, the general suitability of the case for collective 
treatment, and the appropriateness of the representative claimant.104   
Although most of these factors largely resemble the factors 
considered for class certification in the U.S., the consideration of the 
preliminary merits of the claim, in particular, may provide a degree of 
scrutiny not present in the U.S. class certification process.105 In the United 
States, the certification process is only a procedural step to determine 
whether it is appropriate to apply the class action device.  The merits of 
the action are another matter. The merits of a claim may have some limited 
relevance in the U.S. certification process,106 but a discussion of that would 
get too “into the weeds” for our purposes today. Suffice it to say that the 
 
99. Competition Act 1998, c. 4, § 47B(8) (UK). 
100. See Mulheron, supra note 96, at 829. 
101. For one example, see Dorothy Gibson v. Pride Mobility Prods. Ltd. [2017] CAT 
9 (Eng.), where an ideological plaintiff—the General Secretary of the National Pensioners 
Convention—brought a putative CAT collective action on behalf of seniors injured by anti-
competitive practices related to mobility scooters. 
102. Competition Act 1998, c. 4, § 47B(4) (UK). 
103. See Mulheron, supra note 96, at 822–23. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. at 833–34. 
106. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“[T]he court must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to class certification, 
even if they overlap with the merits – including disputes touching on elements of the cause 
of action.”). 
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merits alone are not a valid consideration in the U.S.107 As stated by one 
UK class action expert, the goal of the CAT preliminary merits 
consideration is to go beyond the normal standard for dismissal and target 
“cases which are weak, but not so weak that they could be struck out.”108 
In one case, the CAT explained that the class representative “had to do 
more than simply show that he has an arguable case on the pleadings.”109  
While the CAT certification criteria could help to ensure that only 
proper, strong claims are certified for class treatment, and thereby avoid 
some of the abuses of the U.S. system, they have thus far been applied so 
strictly that, at last check, no collective proceeding order has yet been 
issued.  Indeed, the Competition Appeal Tribunal has considered only two 
cases for certification.110 So while the CAT collective action appeared to 
be a promising method of securing some of the benefits of a U.S.-style 
class action, these benefits seem far from being realized. 
But things may be changing. In April of 2019, the English Court of 
Appeal overturned the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s refusal to certify a 
claim and grant a collective proceedings order in a collective action claim 
against Mastercard.111 One critic argued that the Court of Appeal went too 
far in weakening the certification requirements for a CAT collective 
action. She explained that “[i]f the appellate decision in the Mastercard 
case is allowed to stand, the UK will have a system that is as bad, if not 
worse, than the American system.”112 The UK Supreme Court has since 
agreed to hear Mastercard’s appeal. The proper test for CAT collective 
action certification— and perhaps the practical viability of a CAT 
collective action—hangs in the balance.  
IV. CHALLENGES FACED IN U.S. SYSTEM 
By this point, I hope I’ve been clear that England has been cautious 
in adopting aggregation procedures. Our friends here continue to look 
upon the U.S. model with some suspicion. And that approach is probably 
 
107. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013) 
(“Merits questions may be considered to the extent – but only to the extent – that they are 
relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are 
satisfied.”); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974) (“We find 
nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to 
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit, in order to determine whether it may 
be maintained as a class action.”). 
108. Mulheron, supra note 96, at 834. 
109. Walter Hugh Merricks CBE v. Mastercard Inc. [2017] CAT 16 [57] (Eng.). 
110. See id.; see also Dorothy Gibson v. Pride Mobility Prods. Ltd. [2017] CAT 9 
(Eng.). 
111. See Stephen Wisking et al., Court of Appeal Overturns CAT’s Refusal to Certify 
the MasterCard Collective Action Claim, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 24, 2019), 
http://bit.ly/2lUCAAB. 
112. Lisa A. Rickard, Mastercard: Preventing a US-Style Litigation Monster, LAW 
SOC’Y GAZETTE (July 3, 2019), http://bit.ly/2kezqr2. 
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wise. There are aspects of the U.S. model to be avoided. But as England 
seeks to enhance the benefits of aggregation by introducing procedures 
that are increasingly similar to the U.S. collective action approach, the 
country also opens the door to expanded (and sometimes abusive) 
litigation. Having observed the U.S. class action system as it has 
developed over a good many years, and having participated in that 
development as a judge, I have some familiarity with the most problematic 
elements of the system—and with its substantial benefits. Based on our 
experience in the U.S., I see a few specific problems that English courts 
and practitioners should try to avoid. The U.S. experience offers valuable 
lessons, including lessons in what to avoid, and lessons in how to mitigate 
certain excesses. In the next few minutes, I will review five challenges we 
have faced in the U.S. system, and I’ll suggest how England might avoid 
them. 
A. Objectors 
First, I turn to the issue of objectors to class action settlements. To 
repeat, parties to a class action may submit a settlement proposal and, 
under Rule 23(e), “any class member may object to the proposal.”113 This 
procedure is necessary because non-named class members are bound by 
the settlement; they must have some opportunity to contest it.114 For the 
same reason, non-party objectors can also appeal a District Court’s 
judgment approving a settlement.115 As such, objectors are not inherently 
problematic and can, in fact, be an asset to the class system by ensuring 
that settlements are fair and adequately protect unnamed class members.116 
But where there are objections, the judge overseeing the action must invest 
additional time in hearings to determine if there is merit to the objections, 
and such hearings necessarily add weeks—or even months—to the 
approval process. Similarly, an appeal of a class settlement, even where 
 
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(A). 
114. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (“What is most important to this 
case is that nonnamed class members are parties to the proceedings in the sense of being 
bound by the settlement. It is this feature of class action litigation that requires that class 
members be allowed to appeal the approval of a settlement when they have objected at the 
fairness hearing. To hold otherwise would deprive nonnamed class members of the power 
to preserve their own interests in a settlement that will ultimately bind them, despite their 
expressed objections before the trial court.”). 
115. See id. at 10–11 (“[A]ppealing the approval of the settlement is petitioner’s only 
means of protecting himself from being bound by a disposition of his rights he finds 
unacceptable and that a reviewing court might find legally inadequate.”). 
116. See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or 
Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 408–09 (2003) (“By definition, the 
objector is a monitor, who is evaluating a proposed settlement and then investing resources 
to either improve the settlement terms or reject the settlement. . . . Objectors create an 
adversary contest, usually regarding the difficult process of settlement approval, and 
thereby can perform a positive function.”). 
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meritless, can add months or years to litigation, during which time 
payment to the class and class counsel is delayed.  
This has led one academic to note that “objectors may be the least 
popular litigation participants in the history of civil procedure.”117 In fact, 
they have been described as “warts on the class action process.”118 I 
attended a symposium a few years ago where one of the speakers, a lawyer 
involved in the massive NFL concussion litigation, referred to objectors 
as “scum.” And as another critic has put it: “Objectors are as welcome in 
the courtroom as is the guest at a wedding ceremony who responds 
affirmatively to the minister’s question, ‘Is there anyone here who opposes 
this marriage?”’119  
But whether or not objectors are widely appreciated, the real problem 
for courts and class litigants arises with so-called “professional 
objectors.”120 In the U.S. system, these are attorneys who routinely 
“oppose settlements on behalf of nonnamed class members and threaten 
to file meritless appeals of the final judgment merely to extract a 
payoff.”121 The delay accompanying an objection produces a powerful 
incentive for class counsel to take steps to appease an objector, regardless 
of the merits of the underlying objection. Knowing this, professional 
objectors look for a quick payout. 
Professional objectors free-ride on the efforts of class counsel, who 
have invested substantial time and effort in successfully identifying a legal 
claim and procuring a settlement,122 by extorting payments from class 
counsel to avoid the delay and expense of an objection.123 After the 
objectors receive their payout, they do not file the threatened objection or 
appeal, or, where already filed, withdraw the objection or appeal. This sort 
of objection adds little or nothing to the fairness of the class action 
process—indeed, it raises serious questions about the efficiency and 
integrity of the process. It also carries the potential to discourage lawyers 
from initiating class actions and investing the effort necessary to reach 
settlement, because they know that others who stood on the sidelines are 
likely to get a piece of the settlement they worked to procure.124 
 
117. Id. at 411. 
118. Id. 
119. Lawrence W. Schonbrun, The Class Action Con Game, REG., Fall 1997, at 50, 
53, available at https://bit.ly/2EPlw5A. 
120. Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. 
L. REV. 287, 375 (2003) (defining “professional objectors” as “a term used colloquially to 
describe plaintiffs’ law firms that threaten objections largely as a means to obtain side 
payments for themselves in exchange for their agreement either to drop the objections or 
not to raise them in the first place”). 
121. John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: What 
to Do About Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 865–66 (2012). 
122. See Brunet, supra note 116, at 409. 
123. See Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 865–67. 
124. See Brunet, supra note 116, at 431–32. 
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U.S. courts have also encountered cases in which the objection filed 
is actually (or potentially) meritorious, but the person raising it has the 
intent of merely extracting a payout from class counsel. Clearly, the 
meritorious objection has not been used properly: The objector is not 
motivated by a desire to benefit the class. For example, a potential objector 
who has identified a genuine problem with a settlement may approach 
class counsel prior to filing any objection in court, seeking a payout in 
exchange for not lodging the objection.125 A court can’t consider an 
objection that is never filed, and so a meritorious issue may evade review 
with the result being approval of an unfair settlement.126 Similarly, if an 
objector does in fact file a meritorious objection or appeal, but later 
withdraws the claim, a court may never reach the merits of the issue. In 
these instances, objections are not serving their proper purpose of 
benefitting the class. They are, instead, being used solely for the benefit of 
the objecting attorney. 
Objecting can be lucrative. In one recent case, class counsel reports 
that he paid a well-known serial objector $225,000 after his objection was 
overruled.127 Quite simply, class counsel just wanted the objector to “go 
away” and not hold up the settlement by taking an appeal.128 And by the 
way, that objector is said to have filed 76 objections to class action 
settlements over the years.129 
A significant problem for both judges and class counsel in taking on 
improper objectors is that there may be no evidence of impropriety on the 
record. Some potential objectors contact class counsel informally and 
threaten to raise an objection unless counsel provides a payout. Even 
where an objection is actually filed, it is generally difficult to determine 
whether an objection is intentionally baseless and improper, rather than 
simply weak.130 One reason is that filed objections can be general. Such 
“cookie cutter” objections will apply to any class settlement, such as an 
objection that the attorney fee award in the settlement is too high or that 
the total fund and per-class-member distributions are too low.131 There is 
often insufficient evidence in the record to determine the intent of the 
attorney filing the objection.132 And even routine objectors will sometimes 
file a meritorious objection that adds value to the process, so the fact that 
someone is a serial objector does not by itself mean that the objections are 
 
125. See Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 882–83. 
126. See id. 
127. Michael J. Bologna, Notorious “Serial Objector” May Have Filed His Last 
Objection (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 12, 2019, 8:42 AM), https://bit.ly/2sSYUym. 
128. See id. 
129. See Serial Objector Index BETA, SERIAL OBJECTOR INDEX, 
http://bit.ly/2kigGXO (last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
130. Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 874–75. 
131. See id. at 879. 
132. See id. at 874–75. 
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baseless.133 These factors make it difficult to regulate professional 
objectors because genuine objectors are a key part of the class action 
process, and it can be difficult, at least at first, to spot the difference 
between a baseless, extortionate objection and a genuine, but ultimately 
unsuccessful, objection. But what must be kept in mind is that an 
objection—whether extortionate or genuine—slows the process. And time 
means money. 
As far as I know, England does not have a documented history of 
“professional objectors.” But the collective action system here, in its 
existing form, is not immune to the problem. Class litigators and the 
judiciary need to be on-guard against this form of abuse. The problem is 
most likely to arise in the new CAT proceedings because, under CAT 
procedures, class members have the right to object to a settlement.134 As 
in the U.S., this objection procedure can in many ways ensure the fairness 
of a settlement. And, because England has not yet witnessed a certified 
CAT class, the procedure has not progressed to settlement, where 
objectors might have their day in court. But given the potential for abuse, 
English jurists and practitioners would be well-advised to consider 
adopting procedures that safeguard the settlement process generally and 
protect it against manipulative objections, in particular. 
In the U.S., various options have been proposed to curb abusive 
objections. In fact, Rule 23 was amended at the end of 2018 with the hope 
of curtailing the practice, if not eliminating it entirely. The amended Rule 
includes two new procedures. First, the Rule is amended to require that 
any objections be stated with specificity.135 The Civil Rules Committee 
explained that this change will “enable the parties to respond to [the 
objections] and the court to evaluate them.”136 This should help to prevent 
professional objectors from filing generic objections without establishing 
specific grounds arising out of the settlement at issue. 
Second, under the amendment, “[u]nless approved by the court after 
a hearing, no payment or other consideration may be provided in 
connection with: (i) forgoing or withdrawing an objection, or (ii) forgoing, 
dismissing, or abandoning an appeal from a judgment approving the 
proposal.”137 As explained by the Rules Committee: 
[S]ome objectors may be seeking only personal gain, and using 
objections to obtain benefits for themselves rather than assisting in the 
settlement-review process. At least in some instances, it seems that 
objectors – or their counsel – have sought to obtain consideration for 
withdrawing their objections or dismissing appeals from judgments 
 
133. See id. at 875. 
134. See Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, SI 2015/1648, art. 94(7) (Eng.). 
135. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(A). 
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendment. 
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(B). 
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approving class settlements. And class counsel sometimes may feel 
that avoiding the delay produced by an appeal justifies providing 
payment or other consideration to these objectors. Although the 
payment may advance class interests in a particular case, allowing 
payment perpetuates a system that can encourage objections advanced 
for improper purposes. The court-approval requirement currently in 
Rule 23(e)(5) partly addresses this concern.138 
By requiring court approval for any payment associated with withdrawing 
an objection or appeal, the amended rule will help to prevent extortionate 
payments and avoid the inappropriate withdrawal of meritorious 
objections or appeals. And by simply bringing objection side-deals into 
the open, the amended rule may go a long way toward discouraging 
professional objectors.139 Preemptively adding similar requirements to 
England’s CAT collective action procedure could help to avoid the 
professional objector phenomenon altogether. 
Among other proposals that have been put forth in the U.S.—and that 
may merit consideration in England and Wales—imposing an appeal bond 
on non-party objectors to cover the costs of the appeal as well as the costs 
of delaying settlement is one option. (Full disclosure: Professor John 
Lopatka and I have written an article making that proposal.140) Still other 
proposals include adopting an inalienability rule under which objectors are 
prohibited from voluntarily settling their appeals,141 inserting “quick-pay” 
provisions in class settlement agreements so that class counsel and class 
members are not burdened by the cost of delay,142 expediting the appellate 
process for non-party objector appeals,143 imposing sanctions on 
professional objectors,144 or prohibiting side deals altogether.145 While 
each of these options seems to have advantages, each also raises concerns 
that have been discussed at length in U.S. class action literature.  
The approach that recently took effect is a middle ground that 
preserves the ability for both meaningful objection and withdrawal of 
objections where appropriate, while also taking steps toward discouraging 
the professional objector. It is way too early to judge how far the 
amendments will go in resolving the professional objector problem, but it 
 
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2018 amendment. 
139. See Brunet, supra note 116, at 446. 
140. See Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 929. 
141. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 
1623, 1659–66 (2009). 
142. See id. at 1640–41.  
143. See Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 901–02. 
144. See id. at 896. 
145. See Bologna, supra note 127 (“The only way to stop this is to prohibit all side 
deals – all side deals . . . . If the objectors know they can’t get a side deal, they won’t try 
to blackmail class counsel. This way the only people objecting are people who have a real 
beef with the settlement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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is difficult to see how the measures cannot at least enhance the integrity of 
the class action settlement process.  
B. Collusion Between Class Representatives/Counsel and 
Defendants 
A second, but complementary, issue in U.S. class actions is the 
problem of collusion between class representatives and class counsel and 
defendants and their counsel, almost always to the detriment of non-party 
class members.146 Because it is the colluding parties who are presenting 
the court with the proposed settlement, no one then before the court has 
the incentive to raise concerns about the fairness to absent class members 
of that settlement.147 This points to why the ability to make meritorious 
objections—something I’ve already talked about—is necessary. It is 
essential that the named parties have some degree of accountability to the 
class members given the representative nature of the proceedings.148 But 
objections are not always enough, which has led the U.S. judicial and 
legislative branches to take a number of steps aimed at preventing 
collusive practices in class action settlements. 
One of the important benefits of a well-developed collective action 
system is that such a system allows individuals with low-value claims to 
have their claims processed in a cost-effective way. But this often means 
that individual class members don’t have much “skin in the game.” They 
have little to gain and little to lose. As the Third Circuit has explained, this 
situation creates “a concern that those actions are brought primarily to 
benefit class counsel,”149 who recover fees that eclipse a class member’s 
individual award amount by multiple magnitudes. 
Where the attorneys are more invested in the outcome of a lawsuit 
than are their clients, a perverse incentive arises for the attorneys to settle 
 
146. See Waye, supra note 47, at 112 (“Critics claim that class action settlements in 
the United States are often the product of collusion between defendants and class action 
attorneys seeking to profit at the expense of class members.”). 
147. See Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for 
Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 48–49, 50 n.66 (2002) (“[T]he 
settling defendant and class attorney . . . obviously have no interest in meaningful 
inquiries.”); see also Estelle Hurter, Class Action Settlements: Issues and Importance of 
Judicial Oversight, 51 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 97, 99 (2018) (“Because the absent 
[class] members are not before court and reliance is placed on the representative to act in 
their best interests, a further question for consideration is whether the settlement benefits 
all members equally (or at all).”). 
148. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 
780 (2013) (“Because class actions are representative actions, ‘adequacy’ is the glue that 
holds a class together and ensures due process for absent class members.  The system 
breaks down – and potential due process issues arise – if either the class representative or 
class counsel is incompetent, suffers from a conflict of interest, fails to assert claims with 
sufficient vigor, or suffers from other flaws that will detract from a full presentation of the 
merits.”). 
149. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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the case to their own benefit with little regard for the benefit to the class. 
As Second Circuit Judge Friendly once explained, the attorney has “every 
incentive to accept a settlement that runs into high six figures or more 
regardless of how strong the claims for much larger amounts may be . . . . 
[A] juicy bird in the hand is worth more than the vision of a much larger 
one in the bush.”150 For example, where a settlement directs that attorney 
fees will come out of the class common fund award, the pecuniary interests 
of the class and class counsel are directly at odds. In other cases, class 
counsel may agree to accept a low settlement offer in exchange for the 
defendant’s agreeing not to object to counsel’s fee proposal.151 As one 
court has explained it, “lawyers might urge a class settlement at a low 
figure or on a less-than-optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment 
on fees.”152   
One egregious, and much too common, example of this problem 
arose in the form of so-called “coupon settlements.” In a coupon 
settlement, class members receive no more than a discount in purchasing 
a new product from the very defendant vendor or manufacturer who has 
been sued and wishes to settle.153  The coupon is in lieu of a direct 
monetary payment. Yet while class members have received only a coupon, 
class counsel obtain cash payment for their attorney fees—often based on 
the total value of the coupons—whether or not class members ever redeem 
them. As explained by Congress, “[c]lass members often receive little or 
no benefit from class actions, and are sometimes harmed, such as where 
. . . counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class members with 
coupons or other awards of little or no value.”154 
One example is a 1995 class action in the Third Circuit involving 
defects in GM truck fuel tanks.155 Class counsel negotiated a settlement 
under which class members received only a coupon for $1,000 that they 
could apply to the purchase of a new truck. The total price of a new truck, 
to which the coupon would apply, was estimated at between $20,000 and 
$33,000, and the coupons expired after 15 months.156 Of course, the 
coupons could be used by only those class members who had tens of 
thousands of dollars available to pay the balance of the purchase price.157 
 
150. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., 
dissenting). 
151. See Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 473–74 
(2000). 
152. Weinberger v. Great Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991). 
153. See Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s 
Clothes of Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343, 1344 (2005). 
154. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 4–5 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, and 1711–15 (2005)). 
155. See generally In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995). 
156. See id. at 808. 
157. See id. 
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Other class members would receive no real value, and the settlement did 
nothing to resolve the safety concern with the defective fuel tanks.158 
Further, even where class members did successfully use the coupons, that 
use was a real benefit to the defendant truck manufacturer because class 
members were ultimately returning to that manufacturer and spending tens 
of thousands of dollars over the amount of the coupon.159 Despite these 
obvious problems with the settlement, the District Court both approved it 
and granted class counsel a fee award of $9.5 million—an award our Court 
called “unusually large in light of the fact that the settlement itself offered 
no cash outlay to the class.”160 On appeal, in an opinion written by my late, 
great colleague and friend, Judge Ed Becker, the Third Circuit reversed, 
vacating approval of the settlement and remanding for further 
proceedings.161 
While I’m not aware of coupon settlements or similar abusive 
practices taking hold in England and Wales, they are certainly something 
to be avoided. GLOs have some built-in protections against collusion 
between named plaintiffs and defendants because all class members are 
effectively named plaintiffs in GLOs. Represented parties in a 
representative action also have some protection in that they can 
retroactively opt-out of the class by demonstrating that representation was 
inadequate.162 Notably, in the UK Google representative action I 
mentioned earlier that was rejected in part based on the “same interest” 
test, the Court provided an additional basis for rejecting the representative 
format.163 It stated flatly that “[t]he main beneficiaries of any award at the 
end of this litigation would be the funders and the lawyers, by a 
considerable margin.”164 That’s certainly a positive indication that English 
judges will be considering whether an award ultimately benefits the class, 
or only the attorneys, when deciding whether to approve a representative 
action.  
Still, the lack of court involvement in settlement under both the 
representative action and GLO collective action regimes does present a 
situation where collusion may go uncorrected. Settlement offers in a GLO 
need not be judicially approved,165 and courts are generally not required to 
 
158. See id. at 808, 819. 
159. See id. at 808. 
160. Id. at 810. 
161. See id. at 822–23. 
162. See Neil H. Andrews, Multi-Party Litigation in England 5 (Univ. of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 39/2013, 2013), https://bit.ly/2lPRlot (explaining that 
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163. See supra text accompanying notes 68–72. 
164. Lloyd v. Google LLC [2018] EWHC (QB) 2599 [102] (Eng.). 
165. MULHERON, supra note 54, at 102. 
2020 CLASS ACTION . . . A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 329 
give approval prior to settlement in a representative action.166 With little 
or no court oversight of the settlement process, a settlement that primarily 
benefits counsel is possible—and it should be guarded against. Under the 
CAT collective action regime, judicial approval of a settlement is 
required167 and may help to guard against collusion. Such judicial 
supervision and approval is the first line of defense against abusive 
settlements. Even so, as reflected in the U.S. coupon settlement example, 
judicial supervision is no guarantee against collusive settlements. So even 
as to the CAT system, it may be helpful for England to reflect on some of 
the additional steps we have taken in the U.S. to prevent improper 
settlements and address coupon settlements in particular. 
As criticism of coupon settlements grew in the U.S., Congress took 
concrete action. In the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”),168  
Congress heightened the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to coupon 
settlements and limited attorney fees that could be awarded for such 
settlements, attacking the source of the collusive settlement problem. First, 
as to judicial scrutiny, Congress specified that for a “proposed settlement 
under which class members would be awarded coupons, the court may 
approve the settlement only after a hearing to determine whether, and 
making a written finding that, the settlement is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate for class members.”169 Second, Congress required that, where 
there is a coupon settlement, attorney fees based on the award of coupons 
“shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are 
redeemed.”170 Gone are the days when attorney fees were untethered from 
any benefit class members derived from effectively unredeemable 
coupons. As one pre-CAFA report indicated, “[t]he single most important 
action that judges can take to support the public goals of class action 
litigation is to reward class action attorneys only for lawsuits that actually 
accomplish something of value to class members and society.”171 The 
CAFA, then, was a substantial step toward aligning the interests of class 
counsel and class members, at least as to coupon settlements. 
As I’ve explained, the objector system in the U.S. also provides an 
avenue for addressing the collusion problem because absent class 
members can oppose an unjust settlement proposal and assert their 
 
166. Andrews, supra note 162, at 4 (“[T]he court does not approve settlements of 
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interests.172 But the major limitation of the objector system is that often 
absent class members simply do not have the financial incentive to 
challenge a proposed settlement. Some commentators have suggested that 
what the U.S. class action system needs to protect absent class members 
from collusion is an appointed guardian ad litem for absent class 
members173 or a “‘devil’s advocate’ to oppose class action settlements.”174 
In some instances, public interest groups have taken up the mantel of 
intervening in class actions and objecting to unfair settlement proposals.175 
The CAFA also sought to address the problem of class member 
apathy with an additional requirement that a defendant give notice of any 
settlement proposal to the Attorney General of the United States and to 
appropriate state officials.176 The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or 
relevant state entities have the ability to intervene and object to the 
settlement.177 Whether they have the political will to do so is another 
matter. Unfortunately, the DOJ made little use of this tool early on, filing 
only two objections soon after enactment of CAFA, and then did not file 
a single objection for ten years.178 But in 2018, an associate attorney 
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general announced that the DOJ had modified its screening procedure, 
which would result in objections being filed to unfair settlements.179 And, 
in fact, the DOJ promptly filed three objections by mid-2018.180  
In Cannon v. Ashburn Corp., the DOJ objected to a proposed 
settlement because it paid too much to class counsel and included only 
“limited value” coupons for class members.181 In Cowen v. Lenny & 
Larry’s, the DOJ objected because most of the settlement value was only 
in the form of free cookies (Lenny & Larry’s product at issue in the case), 
and class counsel would receive fees disproportionate to that value.182 
(One can only hope they were darn good cookies). And in Chapman v. 
Tristar Products, the DOJ objected because named plaintiffs and class 
counsel were to receive benefits disproportionate to the value of the 
settlement to absent class members.183 These objections demonstrate the 
power of the CAFA notice provisions, when invoked, to correct and guard 
against collusive settlement practices.  
In 2018, the federal judiciary’s Civil Rules Committee also amended 
Rule 23 to add stronger language to the section providing for judicial 
approval of settlements. As I’ve noted, this first line of defense—judicial 
supervision—may be the best guarantee of a fair settlement. Like CAFA’s 
restriction on coupon settlements, Rule 23 states that, where a settlement 
proposal would bind class members, a court may approve a settlement 
proposal only “after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, 
and adequate.”184 In 2018, the Rules Committee added four specific 
questions that a court must consider before approving a proposed 
settlement: “whether: (A) the class representatives and class counsel have 
adequately represented the class; (B) [whether] the proposal was 
negotiated at arm’s length; (C) [whether] the relief provided for the class 
is adequate, . . . and (D) [whether] the proposal treats class members 
equitably relative to each other.”185 These considerations go directly to 
addressing the collusive practices I’ve discussed by requiring courts to 
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ensure that any settlement actually benefits the class and that it is based on 
appropriate representation by class counsel. As the Rules Committee 
explained, “[t]he central concern in reviewing a proposed class-action 
settlement is that it be fair, reasonable, and adequate,” and the inquiries 
added to the Rule will “focus the court and the lawyers on the core 
concerns of procedure and substance that should guide the decision 
whether to approve the proposal.”186  
One District Court has recently extended Rule 23’s description of a 
judge’s duty to the class in a dramatic fashion—and perhaps beyond what 
the Rule contemplates.187 The Judge concluded that his fiduciary 
obligations permit him to enjoin settlement negotiations altogether until 
after a ruling has been made on whether to certify the class. He explained 
that “[t]o avoid . . . prejudice to absent class members, it is better to clear 
away any doubts about certification, so that if certification is granted, 
plaintiff’s counsel can negotiate from strength.”188 According to the Judge, 
this procedure is necessary in part because, once there is a settlement 
agreement, counsel “will align to support the deal,” and “[n]either counsel 
will surface any problems that might have plagued a certification 
motion.”189 As noted by the court, “[w]hen it comes to class action 
settlements, the usual criticism of trial judges is that they have done too 
little – not too much – in protecting class members.”190 The defendant in 
that action is currently challenging the District Court’s order in the Ninth 
Circuit. Right or wrong, the District Court’s action was unquestionably 
motivated by exactly the concerns I’ve been discussing—the potential for 
a collusive settlement to the detriment of absent class members. And while 
it remains to be determined whether the District Court’s chosen course of 
enjoining settlement negotiations was permissible, in the abstract, close 
oversight and affirmative efforts to protect absent class members is what 
the rules encourage.191 
So by way of legislative action, amendment to Rule 23, and strong 
judicial oversight, Congress and the federal courts have taken steps toward 
elimination of the collusion problem. Although such abusive practices 
may not yet be the problem in England and Wales that they have been in 
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the U.S. system, UK practitioners and law-makers are well-advised to take 
precautionary steps to strengthen judicial scrutiny of settlements and 
eliminate what could be a strong incentive for counsel to act against the 
interests of class members and other represented parties. 
C. Cy Pres 
The third concept, which ties directly into our discussion of collusive 
settlements, is the practice of cy pres distributions. The doctrine of cy pres 
has increasingly been applied in U.S. class actions,192 and has its origins 
in English law.193 In fact, the first modern cy pres cases arose in 
seventeenth century English chancery courts in the context of charitable 
trusts.194 
The common belief is that the term “cy pres” is derived from the 
Norman French expression cy pres comme possible, which means “as near 
as possible,”195 and that is precisely what the doctrine attempts to do—
require that a distribution of money or property be made in a way that is 
“as near as possible” to an intended distribution, where that original 
intended distribution cannot be realized. Although the term cy pres has 
been used to mean many things, I use the term here to describe the payment 
of class action damages to third party organizations, as an indirect means 
of benefitting class members, where distribution to the class members 
themselves is deemed impractical or impossible. 
It is important to begin by noting that application of cy pres is not in 
itself improper or even problematic. Cy pres can be a useful tool where 
courts are unable to distribute a class award directly to class members. 
Where problems arise is when the cy pres doctrine is pushed to extremes, 
as it has been sometimes in recent U.S. jurisprudence. 
As a starting point, there are many reasons why proceeds of a class 
action award may not viably be distributed directly to class members. The 
most common application of cy pres distribution awards occurs when a 
common fund has been created to pay damages to class members, and, 
after class members have made claims on the fund, money is left over.196 
This may happen where the parties have settled and overestimated the 
number of class members, or where class members don’t consider the size 
of their individual awards to be worth the effort of going through the 
claims process.197 With residual funds remaining, the court administering 
the common fund must figure out what to do with them. Options include 
reversion of the unclaimed funds to the defendant, escheat to the state, 
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distributing the funds on a pro rata basis to the class members who have 
already submitted claims, or distributing the fund cy pres to a third party 
organization.198 Cy pres is an attractive option under these circumstances 
because it advances the class action goals of disgorgement and deterrence, 
and is designed to compensate class members, albeit indirectly.199 
In some cases, cy pres has been used as the sole method of 
distributing damages.200 Full cy pres is becoming a common practice 
where distribution of damages to class members is impractical because the 
per-class-member award is so small that it does not justify the 
administrative costs of delivering the award to each class member. In one 
recent case, the award per class member was three cents.201 Of course, a 
U.S. postage stamp currently costs 55 cents. So the theory is that cy pres 
can be used to permit “aggregate calculation of damages” and the 
distribution of funds to “indirectly benefit the entire class,” where 
distribution directly to class members is too costly.202  
The real problem with cy pres arises where the doctrine, “intended as 
a ‘salvage’ tool,”203 is the motivating reason for initiating the class action, 
rather than a tool of last resort. And there are indications that the U.S. class 
action system is over-using—even abusing—cy pres. One study reports 
that, from the advent of the use of cy pres awards in class actions in 1974 
through 2000, courts approved cy pres awards in only 30 cases.204 Then 
from 2001 through 2010, cy pres awards were approved in sixty-five class 
actions.205 Of these sixty-five cases, the majority occurred in class actions 
that were certified only for the purpose of settlement.206 In ten of the sixty-
five cases, the cy pres award was over 75% of the total settlement, and the 
authors of the study concluded that all ten of those cases were “potentially 
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questionable cases” on the merits.207 As discussed earlier, there can be no 
doubt that settlement-only classes, and particularly full cy pres settlement-
only classes, can “be used by parties to conceal problematic types of class 
actions.”208 That is to say, “where the class action procedure is used 
primarily for the benefit of participants in the process other than the absent 
claimants.”209 It is, of course, easier to distribute funds to single, or a 
handful of, organizations than it is to administer the distribution of funds 
to thousands or even millions of class members. In either case, class 
counsel typically collect the same fee.210 
Given the perverse incentives that sometimes exist for class counsel 
in these cases, it is particularly important that any class award be for the 
benefit of class members. As the Third Circuit has explained: “Cy pres 
distributions, while in our view permissible, are inferior to direct 
distributions to the class because they only imperfectly serve the purpose 
of the underlying causes of action – to compensate class members.”211 
Supreme Court Justice Thomas has taken this view a step further, 
suggesting that cy pres settlements are, in themselves, evidence of a 
conflict of interest between class counsel and class members: “[T]he fact 
that class counsel and the named plaintiffs were willing to settle the class 
claims without obtaining any relief for the class – while securing 
significant benefits for themselves – strongly suggests that the interests of 
the class were not adequately represented.”212 
Regardless of whether cy pres awards should ultimately be 
permissible in some cases, it is clear that, too often, the interests of class 
members have been pushed to the side by cy pres awards that inure 
primarily to the benefit of class counsel and defendants.213 Such awards 
create an indirect benefit to class members that is “at best attenuated and 
at worse illusory.”214 
For example, in a class settlement related to the systematic 
overpricing of baby-related products, the defendant retailers paid $35.5 
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million into a settlement fund.215 Of that amount, $14 million was slated 
to go to class counsel.216 And because of difficulties in proving a claim 
(class members were required to submit a receipt), only $3 million of the 
settlement fund—8.5% of the total fund—was expected to go to class 
members.217 That’s only one-fifth as much as what was to be paid to class 
counsel. $18.5 million was left for cy pres distribution.218 The Third 
Circuit rejected this settlement and remanded with instructions for the 
District Court to consider “whether this or any alternative settlement 
provides sufficient direct benefit to the class” before approving the 
settlement.219 
Even more egregious are recent full cy pres cases where class 
members received no benefit at all. In a settlement regarding privacy 
violations by Facebook, Facebook agreed to discontinue an invasive 
program and pay $9.5 million.220 But Facebook was free to restart the same 
program under a new name—and none of the $9.5 million went directly to 
class members.221 Instead, nearly one-quarter of the fund went directly to 
class counsel, and the $6.5 million remaining was used to create a 
charitable foundation to educate the public about online privacy—with the 
condition that a Facebook representative would be one of three members 
of the foundation’s board.222 The rationale behind this use of the fund was 
that the award per class member would be too small to justify 
distribution.223 But the realities are plain: class counsel earned a handsome 
sum from the litigation, and Facebook earned the goodwill that goes with 
participation in a charitable organization, all the while obtaining the 
release of millions of class members’ claims.  As U.S. Chief Justice 
Roberts has explained, there are “fundamental concerns surrounding the 
use of such remedies in class action litigation.”224 
Another example of cy pres gone wrong occurred in Frank v. Gaos, 
a recent case involving a class action settlement with Google, again based 
on privacy violations. In that case, Google agreed to include disclosures 
related to the alleged privacy violation and to pay $8.5 million into a 
settlement fund.225 Under the agreement, however, Google could continue 
with the practice challenged in the lawsuit, and none of the money in the 
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settlement fund would be distributed to class members.226 Instead, over $5 
million was to go to cy pres recipients, and more than $2 million would go 
to class counsel.227 Again, the parties and the District Judge approving the 
settlement justified this procedure on the basis that the per-class-member 
distribution of four cents would be too small to warrant the expense of 
mailing checks. As such, class members themselves were to receive no 
direct benefit from the settlement, leaving them to rely on a potential 
indirect benefit via cy pres distribution. 
The cy pres recipients in Frank v. Gaos were selected by class 
counsel and Google, purportedly to “promote public awareness and 
education, and/or to support research, development, and initiatives, related 
to protecting privacy on the Internet.”228 These are laudable goals, yet the 
organizations actually selected bore little relation to the subject of the class 
action. Specifically, the six organizations selected to receive the over $5 
million in settlement funds were the AARP, four universities, and the 
World Privacy Forum.229 Only the last-named organization has a purpose 
specifically related to privacy interests. Inclusion of the AARP was 
especially troubling because it is a powerful interest group in the United 
States and conducts political activity in many fields wholly unrelated to 
privacy and technology. On review by the U.S. Supreme Court, Chief 
Justice Roberts echoed that concern, even asking during oral argument: 
“[D]o you think that problem is going to be meaningfully redressed by 
giving money to AARP? . . . . [A]s if this is only a problem for elderly 
people?”230 
I should also mention that where cy pres donations to charitable 
organizations are part of the settlement agreement, defendants often 
receive not only the goodwill accompanying those donations, but also tax 
breaks under the U.S. tax code.231 Sometimes, the only people involved in 
the case who fail to benefit from a cy pres distribution are the absent class 
members themselves—the ones whose very claims are being settled. 
While these abuses may not be familiar to the English judicial system, 
cy pres itself is. Indeed, in the 1801 English case Brudenell v. Elwes, Lord 
Chief Justice Kenyon gave a warning that both U.S. and English courts 
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would be well advised to heed: “The doctrine of cy pres goes to the utmost 
verge of the law . . . ; and we must take care that it does not run wild.”232  
Recently, here in England, cy pres has been used in the consumer 
regulatory context. For example, in a highly publicized case in the early 
1990s, Rover Car Company paid one million pounds for car research to 
the Consumers’ Association to compensate for breach of competition 
laws.233 Under the new CAT collective action system, unclaimed funds 
from a judgment must be paid to the aptly named Access to Justice 
Foundation, and unclaimed funds from a settlement are subject to normal 
cy pres distribution or reversion, depending on the circumstances.234  
The CAT procedure of distributing funds to the Access to Justice 
Foundation will avoid the difficulty the U.S. system has faced in deciding 
who should be a recipient of the funds. But it is also likely to present issues 
similar to those raised in the U.S. system as to what the purpose of the 
collective action is and whether distributing a significant portion of funds 
to the Foundation, instead of to class members, adequately accomplishes 
that purpose.  
The cy pres distribution stemming from future settlements under the 
CAT procedure will likely present many of the concerns attendant to U.S. 
cy pres distributions. Bear in mind that class actions under the CAT system 
can be brought by ideological plaintiffs who have no claims of their own. 
That means that no injured individual is necessarily involved in the 
litigation at all. Given the potential for conflicts of interest to arise between 
an ideological plaintiff and the class, ensuring that cy pres distributions 
are appropriate and fair should be a priority for English courts. English 
judges may be able to avoid some of the pitfalls we’ve encountered in the 
U.S. through the consideration of alternatives to cy pres, along with careful 
oversight throughout the course of the litigation. 
The U.S. class action system has yet to fully come to grips with the 
misuse of cy pres. Various alternatives have been proposed, though, and 
through the litigation process courts continue to weigh the appropriateness 
of cy pres awards. Critics of cy pres awards in class actions often propose 
three alternative approaches to address the problems inherent in such 
awards. First, there is the direct payment approach, under which an award 
is given to some class members on a pro rata or random basis rather than 
being distributed cy pres to charities. Another proposed approach is similar 
to the CAFA treatment of coupon settlements under which attorney fees 
for cy pres awards must be tied to the benefit actually received by the class. 
Finally, some critics, including Justice Thomas, suggest an approach under 
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which the need for a cy pres award is considered at the class certification 
stage. If the presiding judge found no direct benefit to class members, the 
class would simply not be certified. Other creative approaches to ensure 
that cy pres awards actually benefit the class, such as allowing class 
members to vote for a cy pres recipient, have been proposed, but they’ve 
not advanced beyond mere academic discussion.235 I’ll discuss the three 
primary cy pres alternatives in turn. 
First, the direct payment approach comes in at least two forms. In 
one, where funds remain even after class members have been 
compensated, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) has proposed that, 
rather than distributing to charities unclaimed or residual portions of a 
class award, the award be distributed to the already compensated class 
members on a pro rata basis. Specifically, the ALI approach suggests that, 
where funds remain after distribution to class members “the settlement 
should presumptively provide for further distributions to participating 
class members,” and only where the amount is too small to make further 
distribution “economically viable” should cy pres distribution be 
considered.236 Although this approach has not been formally adopted by 
Congress or the Civil Rules Committee, it is a logical extension of existing 
concepts regarding compensation to the class. For example, in one 
instance the Third Circuit remanded a judgment providing for a large cy 
pres award, suggesting that the District Court consider “provid[ing] 
greater direct benefit to the class” by increasing the pro rata award or 
“lowering the evidentiary bar for receiving a higher award” rather than 
distributing the significant residual funds cy pres.237   
A very different direct payment approach is called for when a class 
award is insufficient to compensate all class members. Some academics 
have proposed a lottery or sampling approach under which the fund is used 
to compensate some class members at random, rather than distributing all 
funds cy pres and not compensating any class members directly.238  
Both direct payment approaches have the advantage of actually being 
used to compensate the injured class members and eliminating the 
arbitrariness that can arise in cy pres awards.239 Clearly, the primary 
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purpose of a class award is to compensate members of the class, so direct 
payment approaches are superior to cy pres awards. In 2015, the Civil 
Rules Committee considered an amendment that would have adopted an 
approach similar to the one put forth by the ALI.240 Yet for better or worse, 
the Committee ultimately concluded that such an amendment “would not 
be likely to improve the handling of [cy pres] issues” and that such issues 
could be adequately addressed through the existing settlement process.241 
The second approach to remedy the cy pres problem is to treat fee 
awards for cy pres payments in the same way that coupon settlements are 
treated under CAFA: tying attorney fees to the benefit actually conferred 
on class members.242 As Justice Thomas has explained, “cy pres payments 
are not a form of relief to the absent class members and should not be 
treated as such (including when calculating attorney’s fees).”243 The ALI 
has recommended a similar, but slightly more lenient approach, suggesting 
that attorney fees can be based on the value of cy pres awards, but that 
because such awards “only indirectly benefit the class, the court need not 
give such payments the same full value for purposes of setting attorneys’ 
fees as would be given to direct recoveries by the class.”244 In 2017, a bill 
to do just that was introduced in the House of Representatives.245 The bill 
prescribed that, where a class action resulted in a monetary award, attorney 
fees would be “limited to a reasonable percentage of any payments directly 
distributed to and received by class members” and “[i]n no event” were 
attorney fees to “exceed the total amount of money directly distributed to 
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and received by all class members.”246 The bill passed in the House, but 
died in the Senate Judiciary Committee.247 
Still, although this reduced-fee approach has not been codified, some 
courts have applied it in certain instances.248 The Third Circuit has 
explained that “[c]lass members are not indifferent to whether funds are 
distributed to them or to cy pres recipients, and class counsel should not 
be either.”249 So “[w]here a district court has reason to believe that counsel 
has not met its responsibility to seek an award that adequately prioritizes 
direct benefit to the class, . . . it [is] appropriate for the court to decrease 
the fee award.”250 As in the coupon settlement context, such a change 
would help to “better align the interests of class counsel and the class.”251 
Finally, the third approach to address inappropriate cy pres awards 
would be to deny class treatment where it is impossible to actually 
compensate class members. If the purpose of a class action is to obtain 
relief on a class-wide basis, then arguably class treatment is not 
appropriate where there is no direct relief for the class. Indeed, in such 
cases relief in the form of a declaratory judgment or regulatory action may 
be “superior” both in terms of obtaining relief for the class and judicial 
economy. Because under Rule 23(b)(3) a class may be certified only where 
the class action device is “superior to other available methods for fairly 
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,”252 a class should not be 
certified where other procedural devices would be at least as effective. As 
Justice Thomas has explained, a class action may not be superior to other 
procedural devices “when it serves only as a vehicle through which to 
extinguish the absent class members’ claims without providing them any 
relief.”253  
Here is a gross example, in a case from the District of New Jersey, 
where the parties prepared a proposed settlement resulting in a full cy pres 
award, in part because the class members did not want to participate in the 
class action.254 The Court concluded that the settlement was “a thinly 
disguised ploy for the recovery of nearly $500,000 in attorneys’ fees” and 
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that, because the class members did not want to pursue their claims, “the 
[settlement] fund never should have been created in the first place.”255 
Any of these approaches, or a combination of them, could help to 
resolve the cy pres problem in U.S. class action litigation, and a definitive 
ruling on cy pres awards seems imminent. Indeed, the Frank v. Gaos case 
I mentioned was before the U.S. Supreme Court this past term. Some 
anticipated that the Court would address the viability of full cy pres 
awards. The question before the Court was “[w]hether, or in what 
circumstances, a cy pres award of class action proceeds that provides no 
direct relief to class members supports class certification and comports 
with the requirement that a settlement binding class members must be 
‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’”256 Unfortunately, the Court did not 
answer that question, instead remanding the case on standing grounds. 
We’ll continue to wait for the next major development in U.S. class action 
cy pres awards. Regardless, England and Wales may benefit from 
considering these questions preemptively, before the possibility of large 
cy pres awards under the CAT system is realized.  
D. Harassing Claims/Strike Suits 
I’ve been discussing ways in which the class device is abused and 
how the interests of class members are sometimes subordinated to the 
interests of others. But there is another abusive practice in the U.S. class 
action system, and it harms certain targeted defendants: the filing of so-
called “strike suits.” This occurs when plaintiffs file meritless putative 
class actions simply for their settlement value, because they know 
defendants will find it is more expensive to defend the meritless action 
than to pay a settlement.257  
Class actions are themselves big business in the U.S. They’re not a 
“cottage industry.” In a recent survey of 400 U.S. companies, the 
companies reported spending a combined $2.46 billion in 2018 just 
defending class actions.258 The expected cost for the same companies to 
defend against class actions in 2019 is even higher: $2.56 billion.259 When 
so much money is being shelled out just for defense costs alone—not 
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Just as there are professional objectors, there are professional class 
action filers—both attorneys and named plaintiffs who repeatedly file 
class actions, often without adequate legal basis, and almost always for the 
sole purpose of extracting a settlement. In the United States, there are no 
major obstacles to filing a claim, including a putative class action. A 
plaintiff need only file a complaint and pay a filing fee. And if a plaintiff 
does not intend to actually litigate the claim, plaintiff and counsel don’t 
have to spend a lot of money conducting discovery and preparing a case. 
The complaint needs only to meet the minimal standard of plainly stating 
a legal claim. But, for a defendant, defending against even a meritless 
claim may mean significant expense—and perhaps even negative 
publicity.260 
And, unlike in the UK, the American Rule for fees does not 
presumptively allow fee-shifting if a plaintiff’s claim fails. Instead, 
defendants must bear their own costs even when defending against a weak 
claim, unless a defendant can establish that the plaintiff acted in bad 
faith—a high bar that is rarely met where a claim had any arguable merit 
at the time of filing. Defendants therefore have a strong interest in avoiding 
or minimizing defense costs—even if they are confident of ultimately 
prevailing—because they will be on the hook for those costs no matter 
what.261 As one academic has explained it, “[w]hen you win, you lose 
under our system, I win, I defeat your claim . . . but it has cost me tens, 
hundreds of thousands, sometimes millions of dollars. I have a victory that 
has brought me to the poorhouse.”262 Well, it may not always be that bad—
but it is true that some attorneys and plaintiffs can make a decent living 
simply by filing arguably meritless putative class claims “with little hope 
of success on the merits and merely to extract a settlement from 
defendants.”263 As explained by Congress when it was addressing strike 
suits in the securities context, “[w]hether a shareholder lawsuit is 
meritorious or not, the corporation sued must spend a great deal of money 
to defend itself. It is common for a corporation simply to agree to a 
substantial settlement out of court.”264   
Further, given the sometimes astronomical awards in successful class 
action cases, risk-averse defendants may be inclined to settle even when 
there is only a “tiny probability of an enormous judgment,” rather than 
 
260. See Hurter, supra note 147, at 100. 
261. See Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 873. 
262. See MARIE GRYPHON, GREATER JUSTICE, LOWER COST: HOW A “LOSER PAYS” 
RULE WOULD IMPROVE THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (2008) (quoting Professor Jon 
Langbein, The Trouble with Lawyers (ABC television broadcast Jan. 2, 1996)), available 
at https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cjr_11.pdf. 
263. Lopatka & Smith, supra note 121, at 873. 
264. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-50, pt. 1, at 15 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), available at 
http://bit.ly/2muDGna; see also GRYPHON, supra note 262, at 6 (“[S]ettlement of nuisance 
suits is the norm under the American rule.”). 
344 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:2 
engaging in bet-the-company litigation.265 Unlike a typical A v. B lawsuit, 
where a defendant is inclined to take a chance on going to trial because it 
perceives its likelihood of success as substantial, a defendant in a class 
action faces a unique risk of being held liable to a class of at least dozens—
and perhaps tens of thousands—of members.266 Thus, even where a 
defendant believes it is likely to win on the merits, it may conclude that 
the risk is simply too great. As one court has explained, defendants 
effectively face two alternatives: “to stake their companies on the outcome 
of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle 
even if they have no legal liability.”267 
These circumstances have resulted in a cadre of class action filers 
who repeatedly file meritless claims. In the same 2018 survey of 400 U.S. 
companies cited earlier, the companies reported that 39% of class claims 
are settled between the defendant and the named plaintiff in his individual 
capacity.268 Stated differently, the putative class claims are settled as 
standard A v. B claims, paying no heed to the interests of absent class 
members. In these types of individual settlements, absent class members 
are not bound, but of course they have received no benefit. While there 
may be legitimate cases in which it makes sense for a putative class 
representative to settle his individual claim, this individual settlement 
figure might be considered a loose proxy for the number of non-
meritorious putative class claims filed. Presumably, a class representative 
would not settle on an individual basis if there was a decent likelihood of 
a class-wide settlement or judgment.  
Similarly, a study of securities class actions indicates that from 1997 
to 2017, 50% of claims were settled, 43% were dismissed, and less than 
1% went to trial.269 This may suggest, by inference admittedly short of 
empirical certainty, that the majority of putative securities class actions are 
not meritorious. In the early 1990s, one plaintiffs’ firm filed 229 putative 
securities class actions over 44 months. The lead attorney was quoted as 
saying “I have the greatest practice of law in the world. I have no 
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266. See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements 
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extortion not present in the separate-action context.” (footnote omitted)). 
267. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995). 
268. See CARLTON FIELDS, supra note 258, at 35. 
269. STANFORD LAW SCH., SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS – 2018 YEAR IN 
REVIEW 16 (2019), https://stanford.io/2mf2yit [hereinafter Clearinghouse 2018 Year in 
Review]. 
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clients.”270 That’s only an anecdote, but it does highlight an abuse that is 
not reflective of the goal of class actions. As an aside, that attorney and his 
partner later went to prison for bribing individuals to serve as clients.271 
Regardless, then, of the exact proportion of U.S. putative class actions that 
are filed simply for their settlement value, there can be no dispute that the 
practice exists, and that it reflects badly on the U.S. class action system. 
When it comes to strike suits, the English collective action model 
may have the upper-hand. The ratification procedure for GLOs and the 
demanding approval process for CAT collective actions have, as I’ve said, 
resulted in there being only 105 GLOs over the past 18 years, and no CAT 
collective actions at all. These early approval processes, and their strict 
application, likely deter the filing of weak class claims solely to extract 
some kind of settlement. The express consideration of the preliminary 
merits of the case as part of the CAT collective action approval process 
may well be an effective bar on meritless claims. Perhaps even more 
importantly, the English Rule for fee-shifting protects English defendants 
against the enormous costs that are often born by U.S. litigants. Where an 
English defendant successfully defends against an action, whether a 
collective action or otherwise, the plaintiff, if he loses, presumptively 
bears the defense costs.272 As a result, defendants are not under pressure 
to settle simply to avoid attorney fees and costs.   
Still, the United States has taken some steps to prevent strike suits, 
and those measures might be relevant to the evolving English experience 
with aggregate litigation. For example, in the field of securities litigation, 
Congress recognized the problem of unfounded securities fraud class 
actions, and in 1995 passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”).273 Indeed, the purpose of Title I of the Act is clearly identified 
in its heading, “Reduction of Abusive Litigation.”274 Among other things, 
the Act required averments of good faith filings by the representative 
parties and barred “professional plaintiffs” by stating that “a person may 
be a lead plaintiff, or an officer, director, or fiduciary of a lead plaintiff, in 
no more than 5 securities class actions brought as plaintiff class actions . . 
. during any 3-year period.”275 The Act also expressly limits payment to a 
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representative party, through final judgment or settlement, to the amount 
that would be awarded to any other class members,276 removing some of 
the financial incentive for someone trying to serve as a repeat plaintiff. 
The Act further provided for mandatory sanctions and a presumption in 
favor of fee-shifting where a party or attorney files a meritless or 
unfounded complaint in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.277 
The purpose of Rule 11 is to deter meritless pleadings and motions by 
clarifying that filing alone constitutes a certification that there is a basis in 
law and fact for the pleading or motion, and that it is not being presented 
for an improper purpose.278 While Rule 11 has its own discretionary 
sanctions provision,279 the PSLRA mandatory provision amplified the 
force of the Rule. 
The Securities Class Action Clearinghouse began monitoring the 
filing of federal securities class actions in 1996, following passage of the 
PSLRA.280 The Clearinghouse recorded a dip in filing immediately after 
the passage of the Act, with only 110 federal securities class actions filed 
in 1996.281 Since then, however, that number has generally tracked 
upwards. In 2017, 412 actions were filed, while 402 were filed the 
following year. 282 The 402 figure for 2018 is approximately 99% higher 
than the average number of filings for each year between 1997 and 2017.283 
Approximately 200 securities actions have already been filed so far in 
2019, putting filings on track with the high totals reached in recent 
years.284 Here’s an interesting data point: apparently, only three law firms 
are responsible for over half of all securities class action filings in recent 
years, and these same law firms have consistently had higher than average 
dismissal rates.285 So while the PSLRA took significant steps toward 
reducing the incidence of abusive securities fraud litigation, there is reason 
to be concerned that such litigation is again on the rise.286 
In order to more effectively resolve the problem of strike suits being 
filed in the U.S., in the securities field and in others, we may be well-
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advised to take a leaf from the English litigation handbook. The summary 
judgment process in the U.S. is an effective method of weeding out clearly 
meritless putative class actions. The process is less effective, though, in 
protecting defendants where it takes place only years after the filing of a 
putative class action and only after significant and costly discovery has 
taken place.287 Expedited proceedings for unfounded class claims may 
help to resolve this process. U.S. jurists and legislators may also consider 
revising the class certification procedure to include an express 
consideration of the merits of a claim. Expediting class certification could 
also then protect defendants from meritless strike suits.  
Although it would be a radical change, U.S. courts might consider 
moving toward shifting defense costs to professional class action filers 
who repeatedly file weak or unfounded putative class actions.288 This 
procedure proved somewhat successful, at least for a limited time, in the 
securities context under the PSLRA. In general, we in the U.S. are hesitant 
about shifting costs from companies to individual plaintiffs who may be 
attempting in good faith to secure relief. Yet courts cannot sit idly by while 
defendants, usually corporate defendants (which, I realize, do not 
ordinarily engender much sympathy), are forced to absorb significant 
defense costs to defend against unfounded claims. Almost always, those 
costs are passed on to consumers—as businesses make market 
adjustments, and as counsel enjoy windfalls without consequence.289  
E. Class Action Waivers 
Finally, an issue that has in recent years been a hot topic in the field 
of U.S. class actions is the class action waiver. These waivers are often 
coupled with arbitration agreements, especially in employment 
contracts,290 and they effectively prevent employees subject to the 
agreements both from litigating their claims in court and from pursuing 
any form of class-based relief.291 What is even more concerning is the use 
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of class action waivers in standard-form consumer contracts.292 By their 
nature, class action waivers prevent individuals from realizing the 
efficiency and cost-saving advantages of collective action. Two academics 
have suggested that companies that use these waivers are essentially 
“engaging in ‘do-it-yourself tort reform,’ freeing themselves from liability 
without having to convince legislatures to change the substantive law.”293  
Individuals may well be dissuaded from bringing an action at all if 
the costs of litigating a claim are beyond the means of one person alone. 
In the 2011 case of AT&T v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that 
arbitration and consumer class action waiver provisions used by AT&T in 
a consumer context were enforceable.294 In that case, the plaintiffs raised 
claims of fraud and false advertising against AT&T, but an individual 
customer’s damages amounted to only $30.22.295 Such a low amount 
would generally make litigation cost-prohibitive on an individual basis. 
Judge Posner may have said it best when he observed that, “only a lunatic 
or a fanatic sues for $30.”296 Applying a class action waiver to these types 
of claims will likely result in the vast majority of them not being pursued. 
As explained by one leading class action expert, in these types of claims, 
“the class members have no practical remedy without a class action” and 
“[w]ithout the class action device, a company or individual could cause 
small harm to many people, knowing that the costs of bringing individual 
suits would be too great to warrant hiring an attorney and filing a 
lawsuit.”297 Class action waivers have the potential to significantly reduce 
the benefits of the liberal U.S. class action system, and they are becoming 
increasingly prevalent. 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T v. Concepcion, only 316 
claims were filed in arbitration against AT&T between 2014 and 2017.298 
Compare that to AT&T’s customer base of 147 million during the same 
period.299 The author of the report compiling this data concluded: “In short, 
almost no one turns to the self-proclaimed ‘effective’ method of redress 
that companies have imposed.”300  
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Not surprisingly, corporations favor the class action waiver. As one 
academic has put it, “[a] corporate defendant can limit its liability, or 
escape it altogether, through negating the power of the class and its 
combined resources.”301 Indeed, in the 2018 survey of 400 companies 
previously cited, nearly 50% of the companies surveyed responded that 
they included class action waivers in their arbitration agreements.302 And 
in 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court again affirmed the legality of such a 
practice, holding that arbitration agreements including a collective action 
waiver must be enforced as written.303 
So far, it appears that class action waivers have not secured a foothold 
here in England and Wales—at least not nearly to the extent that they have 
in the U.S.304 But courts may very well enforce an arbitration agreement 
to prevent an individual from joining a GLO or even to prevent a class 
member from obtaining damages based on CAT collective proceedings.305   
Unlike the other class action problems I’ve identified, the U.S. 
system has yet to adopt any measure addressing the class action waiver 
issue. While these waivers impair use of the class action device, it is not 
even clear that they should be considered an “issue” requiring correction. 
Not all class action waivers are alike, and they inevitably present questions 
of freedom of contract, unconscionability, and public policy. Yet they 
clearly place at odds the right to contract, along with the enforceability of 
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arbitration clauses, and the liberal class action system in the U.S. Some 
have even gone so far as to opine that the Supreme Court’s class action 
waiver decisions “will be the end of class actions in the United States.”306 
So far, the U.S. Supreme Court seems to lean in favor of arbitration 
provisions,307 but both courts and practitioners should be aware of these 
conflicting interests. 
Given the Supreme Court’s decisions on class action waivers, 
Congress is perhaps in the best position to make any changes regarding 
the practice.308 Yet so far, Congress’s most significant action on the topic 
has been in favor of waivers. In 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau issued a final rule that would have prohibited some providers of 
consumer financial products from using arbitration agreements to bar class 
actions.309 Before the rule could go into effect, Congress disapproved it via 
a joint resolution under the Congressional Review Act, and the President 
signed that joint resolution into law.310   
Recently, employees in some industries have begun to organize 
against the practice of class action waivers, asserting their right to 
collective action and challenging boilerplate contract terms that impair that 
right.311 In 2014, backlash from a broad consumer arbitration provision on 
General Mills’ website—including letters to Congress stating “Trix don’t 
belong in the fine print”—resulted in the company removing the 
arbitration clause.312 So action outside of the judicial process may be an 
effective way, at least for now, of challenging class action waivers.313 Of 
this I am certain: challenges to the class action waiver are by no means a 
thing of the past. 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Let me conclude by admitting that nerdy class action junkies like me 
are comparatively few. I teach the subject. I’ve written on the subject. And 
I continue to be intrigued by the dynamics and the efficiencies of the class 
action device. It is indeed, as Dick Posner has described it, “an ingenious 
procedural innovation.” No country outside of the U.S. has sought to 
exactly replicate it. And that may work to the advantage of those legal 
systems that are only now developing procedures that permit the 
aggregation of claims. 
The collective action system here in England and Wales is still in its 
early stages. I’ve talked about its several forms. As jurists and litigants 
experiment with these new procedural devices, particularly the CAT 
collective action, it makes sense to look to the United States and learn from 
our experiences—both good and bad; both the efficiencies and the 
excesses. We in the U.S. may similarly be well advised to look to both 
new and old aspects of the English system and consider adopting those 
elements that would translate across the Atlantic in a way that could 
improve our class action model. As with all of life, we learn from one 
another. 
 
